Israel-Hamas hostage deal leaves these questions unanswered

Israel will get some hostages back, but may be turning all of us into hostages by restoring assets to Hamas that were taken from it in a difficult war and at a dear price in blood.

Written by Nadav Shragai - a veteran Israeli journalist.

(Jan. 15, 2025 / Israel Hayom)

As hearts and souls burst with the desire to finally see the first hostages return home after so long, minds urgently seek answers to difficult questions that the emerging deal’s details, as revealed so far, do not currently address.

The most challenging question concerns the hostages themselves: How can Israel ensure there will even be a second phase of the deal, and that all hostages—both living and deceased (including the four from before the war: Hisham Sha’ban al-Sayed, Avera Mengistu and the bodies of Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul)—will return to Israel and not be abandoned to their fate in Gaza?

The second question that arises concerns the Philadelphi Corridor. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has promised that Israel would not leave this tunnel-riddled and smuggling-prone strip along the Gaza-Egypt border, which he himself defined as “Hamas’s oxygen and armament pipeline.” What changed regarding this issue that Netanyahu previously categorized as “non-negotiable”? It’s entirely clear that Israel has compromised on Philadelphi, if not beyond—and it’s not even clear if Israel will participate, or participate significantly, in monitoring what and who will or will not pass through it.

The Israeli position regarding northern Gaza (including the Netzarim Corridor cutting the Strip in half east to west) also completely collapsed in the face of Trump’s envoy, who visited Netanyahu’s home last Saturday. Suddenly, this area is no longer vital to the security of the border communities and the south of the country? A million Gazans are expected to return there, many of them Hamas members. How will Israel ensure that Hamas does not rebuild its military strength there and elsewhere?

The deal leads to another conclusion: As of now, Israel is effectively giving up on one of the three war objectives: the governmental and civilian collapse of Hamas, despite the fact that the organization has not been dealt a knockout from a military perspective (although it was hit very hard). The deal leaves Hamas as the governing factor in Gaza and allows it to reestablish itself.

Netanyahu and his ministers will struggle to convince Israeli public opinion that the war will resume after the deal, and that the work in Gaza—which is far from over—will continue at least with the same intensity. Those who were unable to say no to Trump’s envoy even before the new president entered the White House will find it difficult to say no to the incumbent president himself on an issue that is several times more difficult and complex—renewing the war.

Another question mark: Why didn’t Israel manage to wait another week or so for the deal, when Biden was no longer in the picture, to significantly reduce the fuel and food supply to Gaza, and also introduce this very significant parameter into the negotiation picture? Why couldn’t they wait a little longer to work and fight in Gaza with less bound hands, with armaments, and in ways that Biden blocked, and thus perhaps achieve a better deal? After all, the “gift” to Donald Trump could have been given two weeks after he entered the White House.

All this is subject to another huge question mark. We don’t currently know what, if anything, was promised to Israel in return for stopping the war in Gaza. Does the hostage deal stand on its own, or is it part of a much larger story in which Israel received promises on other issues, for example on the issue of the Iranian nuclear program and the overthrow of the regime there?

In any case, after such a deal Israel certainly cannot claim a complete victory. Israel will get some hostages back, but may be turning all of us into hostages by restoring assets to Hamas that were taken from it in a difficult war and at a dear price in blood.

Originally published by Israel Hayom.

Republished with Permission